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NOTES
Administrative Law-Bias-"No man shall judge his own cause"
"[W]hile '[a]n overspeaking judge is no well tuned cymbal' neither
is an amorphous dummy unspotted by human emotions a becoming re-
ceptacle for judicial power."1 These dissenting words of Mr. Justice
McReynolds in Berger v. United States,2 a classic in the field of judicial
bias, vividly disclose the reality of, and perhaps the need for, some degree
of bias on the part of any officer presiding at adjudicatory proceedings.3
Whether such bias violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
however, depends upon both type and degree. Generally four types of bias
are recognized in the field of administrative law :
(a) a preconceived point of view regarding issues of law or policy;
(b) factual preconceptions concerning the parties in particular litiga-
gation;
(c) partiality or personal prejudice;
(d) identifiable interest.
A mere policy bias on the part of an administrative agency is usually
considered within the bounds of due process. "While it is essential to
due process of law in the usual judicial proceeding that the judge shall
be disinterested and impartial, it is not essential to due process that an
administrative officer shall be disinterested and impartial. ' 5 However,
the historical precedent that one with a personal stake in a controversy
should be deemed disqualified dates back to 1610 with the rule set forth
in Dr. Bonhavi's Case6 that "no man shall be a judge in his own cause. "7
This concept was applied in Tumey v. Ohio.8 The Court held a statute
'Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 43 (1921).
2255 U.S. 22 (1921). A trial judge in a prosecution for espionage after World
War I had refused to disqualify himself though admittedly prejudiced against
German-Americans. The Supreme Court held him disqualified to judge fairly and
impartially.
'This view is not altogether unsupported by the judiciary. See generally B.
CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168-173 (1921); Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
'2 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 12.01-12.03 (1958).
De Pauw Univ. v. Brund, 53 F.2d 647, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1931), aff'd on other
grounds, 285 U.S. 527 (1932).
'77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1610).71d. at 642.
- 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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violative of due process, for it conferred upon the judge of a prohibition-
era mayor's court authority to retain for himself only those costs levied
against convicted parties. The Court stated: "That officers acting in a
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the
controversy to be decided is, of course, the general rule .... Nice ques-
tions, however, often arise as to what the degree or nature of the inter-
est must be."'
Recently, in Garvey v. Freeman,'° the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
summarily rejected an attack on the integrity of a rather bizarre com-
modity allotment scheme developed under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act."1 "Community Committees" elected by the voluntary participants in
the 1965 federal wheat program determine the apportionment of the area's
gross support allotment based upon an appraisal of the neighbors' farms'
potential yield. Often, as in Garvey, small farmer representation pre-
dominates. A farmer's potential yield determines the issuance to him
of marketing certificates upon which the subsidies are actually paid, and
the cumulative sum of these yields as determined by the committee must
total the "normal yield" for the county as set by the Secretary of Agri-
culture. Appeal from the determination of the Community Committee
is to the County Committee, then the State Committee, with final deter-
mination resting with a designated Deputy Administrator of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.
Garvey, a large Colorado wheat grower, sought judicial review of
subnormal yield quotas established for his five Kiowa County farms
by the local Community Committee. For 1965, the Secretary had deter-
mined the Kiowa County normal per acre yield to be 19.5 bushels, one
less than the 1964 appraisal. Yet the appraised yield on the Garvey Farms
as found by the Community Committee was 18.6 bushels for 1964, and
this was lowered in 1965 to an estimated average normal yield of 17.26
bushels per acre on the entire area of Garvey Farms-an appraisal 2.24
bushels per acre less than the countywide average. Garvey's request for
redetermination was denied by the County Committee, and this denial
was affirmed by the State Committee, stating that the "yields correctly
reflected Garvey's productivity in relation to yields established for other
similar farms."' 2 While the State Committee twice visited Garvey Farms,
SId. at 522.
10397 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1968).
1152 Stat. §§ 101-518 (1938), as amended 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1964).
12397 F.2d at 608.
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it failed to visit neighboring farms to which the Garvey production was
being compared. Of course the benefit of the subnormal evaluation of
Garvey Farm's efficiency inured directly to the benefit of all other Kiowa
County farmers, including every member of the Community and County
Committees. The court of appeals, though recognizing the probability of
bias, dismissed the question:
It may well be that the County Committeemen and even the State
Committeemen harbored a small farmer's prejudice against a big farmer
and that this was reflected in their ultimate decisions. But, we cannot
subjectively judge the minds of these committeemen or impugn their
good intentions .... 13
Precedent supporting the doctrine of disqualification by reason of in-
terest and defining its scope is varied in time, territory, and subject matter.
The two cases possibly most related to the Garvey situation are State Board
of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners14 and Johnson v. Michigan Milk
Marketing Board." In State Board of Dry Cleaners the California Su-
preme Court held unconstitutional a state statute creating a State Board
of Dry Cleaners that was composed of six members of the dry cleaning
industry and one member of the public and was empowered to fix prices
and determine regulatory matters. In holding that the price-fixing pro-
visions were unrelated to the public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare, the court went on to say that "[w] here the legislature attempts to
delegate its powers to an administrative board made up of interested
members of the industry, the majority of which can initiate regulatory
action by the board in that industry, that delegation may well be brought
into question."-6 In Johnson the Michigan Supreme Court held that a
majority of the members of the Milk Marketing Board, as producers and
distributors, had a pecuniary interest in price-setting. This was held an
unconstitutional denial of due process because matters submitted to the
board could not be considered fairly.' 7
The issue in these and similar cases seems twofold. First, can the
state validly regulate this industry or area of commerce in the exercise of
its police power? Second, can such regulation be carried out by a board of
28 Id. at 612.2'40 Cal. 2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953).
"295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940).
20 40 Cal. 2d at 449, 254 P.2d at 36.
"See Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 872 (1940); Note, 89 U. PENN. L. Rlv. 977(1941).
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interested members of the industry being regulated? North Carolina in
the past has settled problems of interest of members of licensing boards,
who under the subterfuge of public purpose were in a position to protect
private interests and gain a monopoly over the occupation, by answering
the first question in the negative, at least in the areas of tile contracting,18
dry cleaning, 9 and photography.2 ° Yet, the majority of all occupational
licensing boards in North Carolina are composed of from three to five
members, many, and sometimes all, of whom are required to be licensed
members of the profession.2 ' The interest of members of the various
boards would generally be considered too remote to disqualify them from
quasi-judicial functions. 2  Under the Michigan or California rule, how-
ever, delegation of such power to interested members of the occupation
or industry "may well be brought into question.' ' 23 Due process may
require that our courts and administrative tribunals be not only virtuous,
but also above suspicion.
Though the situation of Garvey is similar to Johnson and State
Board of Dry Cleaners, the degree of pecuniary interest is far greater in
Garvey due to the peculiar local nature of the control of the Community
and County Committees. Garvey presents a situation in which the interest
is perhaps as direct and substantial as in the zoning situations, in which
courts generally disqualify members of zoning boards from voting on
the re-classification of sections of real property when the member owns
property within the district under consideration.2 4 The same is true con-
cerning drainage ditch25 and condemnation proceedings.2 " In Snipes v.
18 Roller v. Allan, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957).
1" State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940).
20 State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
" See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 86-6 (barbers), § 88-13 (cosmetic art), § 89-4
(engineers), §§ 90-2 & 90-9 (physicians), § 90-22 (dentists), § 90-55 (pharmacists),
§ 90-116 (optometrists), § 90-130 (osteopaths), § 90-139 (chiropractors), § 90-180(veterinarians), § 90-190 (chiropodists), § 90-203 (embalmers and funeral direc-
tors), § 90-238 (opticians), § 93-12 (certified public accountants), and § 93A-3(real estate brokers) (1965).
" See State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E.2d 660 (1960).
'" State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 436, 449, 254
P.2d 29, 36 (1953).
"'See Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774 (1948) ; S&L Assoc.
v. Township of Washington, 35 N.J. 224, 172 A.2d 657 (1961); Piggot v. Borough
of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, 91 A.2d 667 (1952).
" See Commissioners of Union Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Smith, 233 11. 417, 84
N.E. 376 (1908); Stahl v. Board of Sup'rs of Ringgold County, 187 Iowa 1342,
175 N.W. 772 (1920); Jacobson v. Kanderjohi County, 234 Minn. 296, 48
N.W.2d 441 (1951).
" Eways v. Reading Parking Auth., 385 Pa. 592, 124 A.2d 92 (1956).
OBLIGATIONS OF SHIPOWNERS
City of Winston,2 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court 'held "that the
election by the board of aldermen of one of its own members as "Street
Boss," an office with pay, at a meeting in which he was present and par-
ticipating, was against public policy.2" In Kendall v: Stafford,29 the court
refused to allow members of the county commissioners to raise their own
salaries for reason of interest. The court said that the fixing of salaries
should be left to popular vote.
The power of Congress to set up price control, parity and marketing
programs in the area of wheat production is clear. Similarly, it is for
Congress and the Department of Agriculture to establish the most efficient
and workable administrative hierarchy and procedural rules to deter-
mine the individual rights of program members. Within this broad scope
of Congressional power there exist certain limits, one created by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Certainly a farmer is entitled to
a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity determining adjudicative facts that will establish the farmer's
share of the community or county allotment. In the context of -the Garvey
decision, it is at least arguable that the degree of interest held by the
committee members should be grounds for disqualification under general
administrative law concepts. The entire situation appears to be one in
which, by the mere process of elimination in determining the normal yield
of each individual farmer in the community, each member of the com-
mittee will in fact determine "his own cause."
DONALD W. STEPHENS
Admiralty-Obligations of Shipowners to Stevedore Contractors for
Injuries to Longshoremen
If any boatman or young man of the beach shall undertake to
load or unload any ship or vessel by the job or for a lump sum, they
are bound to load and unload her well and diligently, and as quickly
as they can.... And if... the boatman or young man abovesaid have
to incur any expense or sustain any loss, the said merchants or the
managing owner of the ship or vessel for the merchants is bound to
" 126 N.C. 374, 35 S.E. 610 (1900).
"8 For a similar case, see State v. Thompson, 193 Tenn. 395, 246 S.W.2d 59
(1952).
" 178 N.C. 461, 101 S.E. 15 (1919).
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